Tan 23 (4t4 PPEROEH For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00490R00010 030029-2 f a HY . I iQ Bs, es Eg an = Ss é& a i es is ~ MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DCI BRIEFING. 1. One of the major concerns of Asian leaders since the the fall of Saigon in early 1975 has been that the Soviet Union would move military forces into the area, Asian leaders have been especially concerned about the possibility that the Vietnamese might allow the Soviets to establish a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. (8) A. Soviet technicians have assisted the Vietnamese in improving their port facilities and in training naval personnel, but we have seen no evidence to date of a Soviet naval presence in Vietnam. (S) B. While Soviet freighters continue to offload cargo at several Vietnamese ports, no Soviet warship has visited Cam Ranh Bay or for that matter any other Vietnamese naval facility. .(S) C. The Vietnamese use a small part of Cam Ranh Bay as "a naval training school. Other facilities at the base are Beinn: aesneutied: These. photographs show that many of the buildings at the base are being torn down, and we see no sign of heavy equipment being installed to service large naval ships. (TSR) Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030029-2 ‘* ~ Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R0QQ100030029-2 II. In Signing the Peace and Friendship Treaty on 3 November, the Vietnamese clearly moved closer to the Soviet Union. During the past two months, we have observed a substantial increase in Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam. We expect both to increase as the year goes on, (8S) A. In late November, Soviet cargo ships called at Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and offloaded two Zhuk-class coastal patrol craft, and early last noath, the Soviets delivered two Petje e lade’. frigates to the Vietnamese, (S) B, This is a recent photaeeaen of the two peryae at the Da Nang naval base. The Vietnamese have been training on the ships off the coast near Da Nang. (TSR) ItT. In the South China Sea, the Vietnamese are tightening their hold on the seven islands that they now occupy in the Spratlys. The Vietnamese have placed small troop garrisons on each of those islands and placed field artillery and antiaircraft gun positions on each island. A. As shown on this recent photograph of Spratly Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030029-2 Ce eel ad » Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030029-2 eS ei? al Island, the Vietnamese have built a small air- field and numerous gun emplacements. ihe Vie sieueae recently moved a helicopter gunship to the island. Vietnamese transports occasionally fly reconnaissance missions over the Spratlys, but we have not yet seen them use the airfield. (TSR) .IV. In Kampuchea, a massive Vietnamese invasion by some | 15 divisions supported by air, tank, and artillery units has succeeded in gaining control over wiptuaiyy all of the population centers, including the capital of Phnom Penh. We are seeing increasing signs that the remaining Kampuchean forces are putting up stiff re- sistance in several sectors of the country. Moreover, the Vietnamese evidently overextended themselves and are now experiencing some serious logistic problems. (8S) A. These are recent photographs showing Vietnamese tanks and other heavy equipment in down town Phnom Penh. (TSR) - Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030029-2